H eyes (1993, 1994, 1998) has started a discussion on methodological aspects of theory of mind research in nonhuman primates. One test that she has critically analysed is the 'mirror mark test'. In this test, nonhuman primates are anaesthetized which allows a facial dye mark (upper left ear and right eyebrow ridge) to be put on without the animal knowing so, or noticing it. Upon recovery, mark-directed touches are scored without and with the mirror being present. To account for the test outcome, Heyes introduced a hypothesis (the anaesthetic recovery hypothesis: Heyes 1994 Heyes , 1995a Heyes , b, 1998 that differs from (one of) the main hypothesis (selfrecognition hypothesis; Gallup 1970 Gallup , 1998 Gallup et al. 1995; Povinelli et al. 1997) . Here I show that the anaesthetic recovery hypothesis cannot be considered valid.
The crucial two questions regarding self-recognition are (Heyes 1998, page 102): (1) 'is there reliable evidence that primates have the relevant behavioral capacity?' (competence); and (2) 'if present, would this behavioral capacity indicate theory of mind?' (validity). Heyes's (1998) answer to both questions is 'no'. In this review I deal with question (1) in the context of the anaesthetic recovery and self-recognition hypotheses. Other (methodological) issues regarding both questions I discuss only briefly (and see de Veer & van den Bos, in press).
Heyes (1994) has suggested that, in nonhuman primates (i.e. chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, and orangutans, Pongo pygmaeus) with high baseline frequencies of self-directed behaviour, recovery from the anaesthetic could account for positive outcomes of the mirror mark test such as the higher number of mark-directed touches in the 30-min mirror condition than in the preceding 30-min control session. In this context 'self-directed behaviour' should not be read as 'mirror-guided bodydirected behaviour', but rather as body-directed behaviour occurring independently of the presence of the mirror (Heyes 1994). In other words, this hypothesis interprets both self-directed ànd mark-directed behaviour not as mirror-guided but as mirror-independent behaviour.
The anaesthetic recovery hypothesis sharply contrasts with Gallup's (1970; cf. Gallup et al. 1995) hypothesis that the increase in mark-directed touching is due to the animals using the mirror to inspect otherwise invisible marked parts of their faces (right eyebrow ridge and upper left ear) indicative of self-recognition and thereby supporting, and more objectively so, other observations (e.g. on self-directed behaviour) in the same animals indicating self-recognition. In this context 'self-directed behaviour' is meant as 'mirror-guided self-directed behaviour' (Gallup et al. 1995) , 'self-exploratory behaviour' (Povinelli et al. 1993) or 'self-referenced behaviour' (Kitchen et al. 1996) . In other words, this hypothesis interprets both self-directed ànd mark-directed behaviour as mirror-guided behaviour.
Heyes's hypothesis accounts for the difference between the mirror mark test results of chimpanzees and orangutans on the one hand (positive mark test outcome) and gorillas, Gorilla g. gorilla, and several monkey species on the other (negative mark test outcome) in terms of their difference in baseline levels of self-directed behaviour (high in chimpanzees and orang-utans, low in gorillas and monkeys; Heyes 1994). Gallup's hypothesis interprets these data rather in terms of a difference in the ability to self-recognize, thereby introducing a phylogenetic gap between (at least) some apes and monkeys (see Povinelli & Cant 1995; Gallup 1997) . So, acceptance of this hypothesis has far-reaching consequences for understanding the phylogenetic trajectory of the 'self-recognition trait'.
